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Abstract: According to Broom (2014), animal welfare is a concept that can be applied to 
all animals, including single-celled organisms that are obviously not sentient. Such a 
stance makes it difficult to draw a connection between welfare and sentience, and that is 
the book’s downfall. Some excellent points are made about sentience and there are very 
good discussions on animal welfare. However, unless sentience is considered the 
essential component of welfare, any attempt to link the two phenomena will be 
unsuccessful — and that, indeed, is the case with this book. 
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Right from the start, I had a problem trying to decide which audience Professor Broom was 
aiming at with his recently published book Sentience and Animal Welfare (2014). Is it the lay 
public? If so, it does not tell a very captivating story. Is it undergraduate students?  Again, the 
theme is fractured and does not hang together very well. If it is intended for a more advanced 
audience, then it is simply too elementary. Good points are made throughout the text, but it 
neither tells a good story nor moves the science of animal welfare forward in any discernable 
way. 
 
Broom’s coverage of the history of understanding sentience in animals and of animal welfare 
science is somewhat inadequate. For example, in Chapter 1, he reaches back to the 1990s to 
describe the qualities that make up sentience. And yet William Youatt (1839) had described 
most of these qualities 150 years previously. Also in the 19th century, George John Romanes 
had taken up where Darwin’s The Descent of Man (1871) and The Expression of the Emotions in 
Man and Animals (1872) had left off.  
 
In his book Mental Evolution in Animals, George J. Romanes (1884) wrote that “Pleasures and 
Pains must have been evolved as the subjective accompaniment of processes which are 
respectively beneficial or injurious to the organism, and so evolved for the purpose or to the 
end that the organism should seek the one and shun the other.” Later he stated, “Thus, then we 
see that the affixing of painful or disagreeable states of consciousness to deleterious changes of 




the organism, and the reverse states to reverse changes, has been a necessary function of the 
survival of the fittest.” So by the 1880s, Romanes was saying almost exactly what animal welfare 
scientists are saying today. Broom would do better to try to explain why it took so long for 
feelings to be accepted as critical for welfare. 
 
Duncan and Fraser (1997) describe three schools of thought on what animal welfare is all about: 
 
(1) Welfare is to do with the subjective experience of animals, i.e., how much they 
experience pleasure and suffering. Into this school, amongst others, they placed Dawkins 
(1980, 1988, 1990), Duncan and Dawkins (1983), and Duncan (1987) and Fraser (1993). 
 
(2) Welfare is to do with good biological functioning in the animal. Welfare will be 
reduced by disease, injury and malnutrition. Good welfare will be indicated by high levels 
of growth and reproduction, normal physiological functioning, and a high degree of 
biological fitness. Curtis (1987), Fraser and Broom (1990), and Broom and Johnson (1993) 
fall into this school. 
 
(3) Welfare is to do with natural living. Welfare will be increased by keeping animals in 
“natural” environments that allow them to engage in “natural” behaviour. Into this 
school of thought were placed Webster et al. (1986) and Rollin (1992, 1993). 
 
In two of Broom’s textbooks published in the early 1990s, Farm Animal Behaviour and Welfare, 
(Fraser and Broom, 1990) and Stress and Animal Welfare (Broom and Johnson, 1993), little 
mention is made of the role of sentience. The approach to animal welfare outlined in both these 
books is most definitely based on whether the animal’s biological systems are functioning 
normally. Broom is therefore rather late in aligning with the “Feelings School.” Perhaps because 
of this lateness, he seems now to strive desperately to make up for lost time, but he does not 
succeed in marrying sentience to animal welfare very convincingly. Nevertheless, he is welcome 
to the fold, even if his commitment to sentience is not entirely wholehearted. 
 
Chapter 2, dealing with ethics, morality and attitudes, was one of the weaker chapters in the 
book. Any first-year university text such as The Elements of Moral Philosophy by James Rachels 
(2003) gives a much clearer philosophical approach to various everyday problems including how 
we deal with animals. Broom covers humankind’s obligations to animals reasonably well but 
dismisses Animal Rights out of hand. In my opinion, obligations and rights are simply opposite 
sides of the same coin. I have an obligation not to lie to you; you have a right not to be lied to by 
me. If we have an obligation not to cause injury to animals, do animals not have a right not to be 
injured by us?  It is ironic that on page 15, where Rights are described and dismissed, there is a 
table with the caption Evidence that can be used to decide which animals should be protected, 
which could easily be reworded as Evidence that can be used to decide which animals have a 
right to be protected. 
Also in Chapter 2, the notion of Freedom as applied to animals is described, and here I find 
myself much more in tune with Broom. I think the idea of “The Five Freedoms” was a useful 




stop-gap measure in the early days of animal welfare science, but one which we should have 
moved way beyond in 2015. Hunger and thirst, and pain and discomfort are all absolutely 
essential subjective states that have evolved to help the animal protect itself. There can never 
be complete freedom from those states. What we should be striving for is freedom from 
suffering — in other words, freedom from intense and long-term negative feelings. 
 
My criticisms of Chapter 3 are similar to those of Chapter 1. It is interesting that reference is 
made to Ruth Harrison’s (1964) book Animal Machines without pointing out that all of her 
criticisms of intensive animal husbandry systems were based on the feelings of the animals 
involved. She said quite explicitly that when treated in certain ways, these animals would be 
frightened or frustrated or in pain. Similarly, it was stated in the Brambell Report (Command 
Paper 2836, 1965), which was published in response to the huge public outcry following the 
publication of Animal Machines, that “Welfare is a wide term that embraces both the physical 
and mental well-being of the animal. Any attempt to evaluate welfare, therefore, must take into 
account the scientific evidence available concerning the feelings of animals that can be derived 
from their structure and functions and also from their behaviour” (emphasis is mine). The 
chapter describes a lot of research into animal stress and the scientists who were involved, but 
ignores the fact that both Harrison and the Brambell Committee were pointing to feelings as an 
important component of welfare in the early 1960s. 
 
Later in Chapter 3, Broom introduces the concept of “coping” and gives several references to 
previous papers of his that have described it. In my view, “coping” is a weasel word. It has a 
generally understood, non-scientific meaning that (in my opinion) does not translate into 
scientific terms. It has no explanatory value. In 25 years of teaching animal welfare science, I 
have not used the word or the “concept.” I suspect that the only reason that the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE, 2011) refer to it is that they have heard Broom repeating it 
so often that they thought there must be a well-established concept involving coping. 
Chapter 3 finishes with an unsuccessful attempt to link animal welfare with sentience. The 
statement is made, “Hence it is possible to consider the welfare of any animal.” I disagree with 
this idea completely and concur with Kirkwood (2006) that welfare is a characteristic of only 
sentient animals. If “welfare” can be applied to single-celled animals, then why cannot it be 
applied to single-celled plants? Why not to plants in general? If used in such a loose way, the 
term loses all of its meaning and power. 
 
Chapter 4 is an interesting account of animals’ cognitive abilities, which I enjoyed reading. 
However, the relationship of these abilities to welfare is not fully explained. And in the words of 
Jeremy Bentham, “The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? But, Can they 
suffer?” (Bentham, 1823). 
 
Chapter 5 deals with feelings and emotions and is one of the stronger chapters in this book. The 
contents are fairly comprehensive, although frustration is not mentioned. This would also have 
been a good opportunity to mention malaise or feeling ill and contrasting that with being ill. 
Boredom, which is generally regarded as a negative emotional state, is also missing. However, 
the topics that are covered are covered well. 





The next two chapters deal with awareness and consciousness, and motivation and needs. I felt 
that these were good as far as they went, but they would benefit from some expansion. 
Welfare Assessment is covered in Chapter 8, and Broom’s leaning to the Biological Functioning 
school of thought is clearly demonstrated. He covers the physiological indicators of poor welfare 
very thoroughly. However, surely the crucial question is “Does it matter to the animal?” This 
seems to get tacked on as an afterthought. In my view, the question of whether it matters to 
the animal should be the primary one. The answer to this question can then be backed up and 
corroborated by physiological indicators. If it doesn’t matter to the animal, then it is of no 
consequence to the animal’s welfare. 
 
Towards the end of this chapter there is a good discussion on the integration of welfare 
measures and a very fair and balanced review of Wemelsfelder’s ideas. I am certain that this 
field will gain importance as we investigate it in more depth. I thought that the following section 
on risk and benefit analysis was also interesting. There can be little doubt that cattle with bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy are actually suffering from it (at least in the latter stages of the 
disease). However, it would have been nice to incorporate some anomalies. For example, does a 
very fast-growing and apparently thriving broiler chicken who succumbs in its fourth week of life 
to sudden death syndrome have good welfare or poor welfare? 
 
Chapter 9 has a good discussion of sentience during development that compares altricial with 
precocial species. The work of David Mellor is well covered (e.g., Mellor et al., 2005), including 
the potential for suffering in fetal and newborn animals. I thought the suggestions as to when 
sentience might be considered as existing in a fetal animal were good, but perhaps they did not 
take sufficient account of the previous discussion about altricial and precocial species.  
 
So Broom considers that an individual may be considered sentient after 50-70% of the 
development period up to birth or hatching. However, a marsupial that has 70% development 
before birth will be much less sentient than a lamb that has 70% development before birth. 
Similarly, a sparrow that has 70% development before hatching will be much less sentient than a 
domestic chick that has 70% development before hatching. Nevertheless, the conclusion is that, 
if procedures that require anaesthesia or analgesia in a newly born or newly hatched individual 
are carried out on a fetal individual that is suspected of being sentient, then that individual 
should be given anaesthetic or analgesic cover as well. 
 
In Chapter 10, the question is raised about which animals should be protected. Broom states 
that many people consider that sentience is a criterion for deciding which animals should be 
legally protected by laws. (I would argue that this should be the only criterion). However, he 
goes on to restate that the concept of welfare can be applied to all animals. In my opinion, this 
devalues the term completely. It doesn’t matter to a protozoan what happens to it. If it makes 
sense to talk about the welfare of a protozoan, then why not of a potato? 
 
The final chapter of the book deals with sustainability (but the connection to sentience or 
animal welfare is unclear to me), welfare attitudes and education. The latter two topics are 




covered quite well. The description of welfare improvements to farm animals coming about as a 
result of consumer pressure is good. The section on the welfare of wild animals and pests is also 
dealt with in a balanced way. As a Canadian, I appreciated the discussion on the seal hunt, which 
Broom handles very fairly. The seal hunt is not the torture chamber that it is often portrayed as. 
However, neither is it humane, and Broom lays out the evidence very objectively. 
 
There is a fairly long section on the effects of genetic modification (GM) on welfare. I would 
have liked to see more on the effects of conventional breeding methods on welfare, which are 
touched on only briefly. In many ways, conventional breeding practices are more insidious; 
changes occur gradually and by the time a welfare problem is recognized, the original breeding 
stock have disappeared, and it is difficult to correct the problem. On the other hand, effects due 
to GM can be recognized early in the breeding program. If these are deleterious to welfare they 
can be stopped immediately (assuming that there is a will to stop them). 
 
This final chapter ends with a brief description of laws and codes designed to protect welfare, 





Bentham, J., 1823. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, UK. 
 
Broom, D.M., 2014. Sentience and Animal Welfare. CABI Publishing, Wallingford, UK. 
 
Broom, D.M. and Johnson, K.G., 1993. Stress and Animal Welfare. Chapman and Hall, London, 
UK. 
 
Command Paper 2836, 1965. Report of the Technical Committee to Enquire into the Welfare of 
Animals kept under Intensive Livestock Husbandry Conditions. HMSO, London.      
 
Darwin, C., 1871. The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. John Murray, London, 
UK. 
 
Darwin, C., 1872. The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. John Murray, London, UK. 
    
Dawkins, M.S., 1980. Animal Suffering: The Science of Animal Welfare. Chapman and Hall, 
London, UK.  
 
Dawkins, M.S., 1988. Behavioural deprivation: a central problem in animal welfare. Appl. Anim. 
Behav. Sci., 20: 209-225. 
 
Dawkins, M.S., 1990. From an animal’s point of view: motivation, fitness, and animal welfare. 
Behav. Brain Sci., 13: 1-9 and 54-61.  





Duncan, I.J.H., 1987. The welfare of farm animals: an ethological approach. Sci. Prog. Oxford, 71: 
317-326. 
 
Duncan, I.J.H. and Dawkins, M.S., 1983. The problem of assessing ‘well-being’ and ‘suffering’ in 
farm animals. In: Smidt, D. (Ed.), Indicators Relevant to Farm Animal Welfare. Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague, The Netherlands, pp. 13-24. 
 
Duncan, I.J.H. and Fraser, D., 1997. Understanding animal welfare. In: Applby, M.C. and Hughes, 
B.O. (Eds.), Animal Welfare. CABI Publishing, Wallingford, UK, pp. 19-31.  
 
Fraser, A.F. and Broom, D.M., 1990. Farm Animal Behaviour and Welfare, 3rd ed. Baillière 
Tindall, London, UK. 
 
Fraser, D., 1993. Assessing animal well-being: Common sense, uncommon science. In: Food 
Animal Well-Being. Purdue University Office of Agricultural Research Programs, West 
Lafayette, IN, pp. 37-54. 
 
Harrison, R., 1964. Animal Machines. Vincent Stuart, London, UK. 
 
Mellor, D.J., Diesch, T.J., Gunn, A.J. and Bennet, L., 2005. The importance of ‘awareness’ for 
understanding fetal pain. Brain Res. Revs., 49: 455-471. 
 
OIE, 2011. Terrestial Animal Health Code. OIE, Paris. 
 
Rachels, J., 2003. The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 4th ed. McGraw-Hill, Boston, MA. 
 
Rollin, B.E., 1992. Animal Rights and Human Morality. Revised edition. Prometheus Books, 
Buffalo, NY. 
 
Rollin, B.E., 1993. Animal welfare, science and value. J. Agri. Environ. Ethics, 6 (Suppl. 2), 44-50. 
 
Romanes, G.J., 1884. (reprinted 1969). Mental Evolution in Animals. AMS Press, New York, NY. 
 
Webster, J., Saville, C. and Welchman, D., 1986. Improved Husbandry Systems for Veal Calves. 
Farm Animal Care Trust, London, UK. 
 
Youatt, W., 1839. The Obligation and Extent of Humanity to Brutes, Principally Considered with 
Reference to the Domesticated Animals. Republished in 2004. Edited, introduced and 
annotated by R. Preece. Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY. 
 
